Presidents in Crisis by Michael K Bohn

Author:Michael K Bohn
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Arcade Publishing
Published: 2015-01-01T05:00:00+00:00

In the fall of 1981, Qadhafi threatened to kill Reagan and members of his cabinet, and evidence of the plan filtered into the White House. In November, the president approved a package of sanctions against Libya and ordered the preparation of military options designed to change Qadhafi’s behavior, but not directly effect a “regime change,” as such actions are called today. The administration also branded Qadhafi the “most dangerous man in the world.” The sanctions appeared to force an observable diminution of Libyan-sponsored subversion and terrorism sponsorship.

Hostile actions by Libya picked up in 1984, when a Libyan freighter deployed anti-ship mines in the Red Sea; eighteen vessels were damaged. There was no evidence that Libya played a role the following year in the TWA 847 incident, but Qadhafi did provide training camps for the Palestinians who hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro. However, in late August 1985, Reagan approved an aggressive program to thwart Qadhafi’s adventurism, which included an appeal to Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak for a joint Egyptian-American invasion of Libya; Mubarak declined.

The Qadhafi-supported Abu Nidal Organization struck hard, though, on November 23, 1985, by hijacking an Egypt Air 737 en route from Athens to Cairo. A combined sixty people died in a gunfight aloft and in a shoot-out after an emergency landing in Malta. A month later, on December 27, ANO gunmen simultaneously attacked airports in Rome and Vienna, killing a total of eighteen people. Five of them were Americans, including an eleven-year-old girl. The ANO had used Libyan passports and weapons traced to Libya.

In an NSPG meeting on January 6, Shultz urged Reagan to approve a military strike on Libya and argued that such action was justifiable self-defense. Typically, Weinberger dissented and questioned the accuracy of the evidence of Libyan involvement and the deterrence effects on Qadhafi. He also said an assault might trigger retaliation against US citizens working in Libya; he didn’t want another Iran-Carter situation. Reagan decided against a military option.

Nevertheless, Reagan did approve the preparation of contingency military targets in Libya, diplomatic initiatives, and the severance of almost all remaining economic ties with Libya. On the NSC staff, Howard Teicher, Jim Stark, Ollie North, and two others began developing a Libya strategy, one, according to Teicher, involving “steadily increasing pressures and disproportionate responses” to Libyan provocations.

One of the staff’s initiatives was to again challenge Libya’s claim to the Gulf of Sidra. Qadhafi had drawn a “line of death” across the gulf from the eastern headland near Benghazi to the western side near Misrata. He threatened to savage anyone that crossed the line. The Pentagon scheduled two “freedom of navigation” exercises north of the line in March, followed by a third into Qadhafi’s death zone. The US Navy’s Sixth Fleet would poke Qadhafi in the eye and force him to fight or back down.

The State Department contacted European allies before the start of the Gulf of Sidra operations. Although many had joined America on some sanctions, France, Italy, and West Germany didn’t want to seriously disrupt their international trade with Libya.

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